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RECENT CASES
The vendor, in an executory contract, holds the legal title as security for en-
forcing the conditions of the contract.1 3 Thus, since he is entitled to dis-
charge the obligation when payment is made,' 4 he should also be enabled to
execute a marketable title pursuant to the contract. 15
Although the question raised has not been resolved in this jurisdiction, the
North Dakota Title Standards Committee has ruled that since there is a
divergence of authorities in other states raising a reasonable doubt about the
validity of a conveyance by the survivor, the surviving co-tenant does not
possess a marketable title.16 It is submitted that this ruling should not be
relied upon by North Dakota lawyers as it is contrary to the holdings of the
better reasoned decisions. Furthermore, it seems that the tendency of this
jurisdiction is in the direction posited herein.'
7
FREDRCIK R. ALM II.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXECUTION THEREOF -
DESCRIPTION OF PLACES, PERSONS, OR THINGS IN AFFIDAVITS OR WARRANTS. -
Defendant was convicted of possession of liquor in a dry area for purpose of
sale. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals contending that the search
warrant authorized search of the "Cotton Club" located on "Slaton Highway
No. 84", and although there was but one Cotton Club in the county, said
highway did not exist, and the misdescription rendered the warrant invalid.
The court held that all that is required to validate a search warrant is that
there be sufficient definiteness to enable the officer to locate the property and
distinguish it from other places in the community. The dissenting judge argued
that if both state and federal constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
and unlawful search and. seizure are yet in force, the erroneous description in
the search warrant precluded the receipt in evidence of the results of the
search.' McCormick v. State, 331 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1960).
The Constitution of Texas requires the person or thing seized to be de-
scribed "as near as may be". 2 Both the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of North Dakota require "particularly describing" the
trator, beneficiaries, heirs or creditors of the husband . . . the clear implication-relating
to titles is disastrous . . . if the majority opinion prevails, these titles (executed by sur-
viving grantor-joint tenants) are now highly suspect."
13. Schauble v. Schulz, 137 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. 1905), where the court states,
it is also the accepted rule in the state of North Dakota . . . that the vendor holds
the legal title in trust .. ." Accord, In re Briebach's Estate, 132 Mont. 437, 318 P.2d 223
(1957) (vendor holds the title of the realty as secuity); Semmler v. Beulah Coal Mining
Co., 48 N.D. 1011, 188 N.W. 310 (1922) "In equity, the estate is measured as a fee
subject to the vendor's lien."
14. McArthur v. Weaver, 129 App. Div. 743, 113 N.Y.Supp. 1095 (1909); see Swen-
son & Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 466 (1954).
15. See authorities cited in note 14, supra.
16. N.D. State Bar Title Standards Committee § 1.12 (1954). For a sharp criticism of
this point, see Swenson & Degnan, Severence ot Joint Tenancies, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 466
(1954).
17. In re Kaspari's Estate, 71 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1955) (".. title to the house
. vested in Inez Mae Kaspari as the surviving joint tenant under the joint tenancy
survivorship deed .. "); cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 85 N.W.2d 211, 224 (N.D. 1957)
(citing In re Kaspari's Estate,supra).
1. Judge Davidson relied on Balch v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 327, 115 S.W.2d 676
(1938) wherein the warrant described the premises to be searched as "302 East Robbins
St", while the premises searched ,were at "304 Robbins St." See alsd- Ervin v. State, 165
Tex. Crim. 391. 307 S.W.2d 955 (1957); Childress v. State, 163 Tex., Crim. 479, 294
S.W.2d 110 (1956).
2. Tex. Const. art. I, § 9.
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premises.3 It has been said that the latter is to be reasonably interpreted as
meaning that the place is to be designated with sufficient accuracy to prevent
the officer from searching the premises of one person under a warrant directed
against those of another, and does not necessarily require a minute and de-
tailed description of the property to be searched.
4
With reference to these constitutional provisions, authorities, in challenging
the validity of search warrants, have applied the following tests: The officer
must have been able to locate the premises with certainty,5 reasonable cer-
tainty,6 definitely and with certainty,7 with reasonable effort,s without the
use of his discretion, 9 or without outside assistance. 10 Similarly a warrant has
been held valid if clear of ambiguity," or if it pointed out the place to the
exclusion of others and led the officer unerringly to it.
12
Although North Dakota has no case in point, it is submitted that they will
honor the more liberal view in giving effect to a search warrant wherein the
description of the premises is erroneously stated.
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TORTS - EFFECT OF MARRIAGE - RIGsrr OF WIFE To SUE DivoRcED Hus-
BAND FOR TORT COmMITrED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE. - Plaintiff was injured while
riding with defendant and brought action for personal injuries. Upon subse-
quent marriage of parties, action was dismissed without prejudice. Two years
later the husband obtained a divorce. Plaintiff appeals from trial court's re-
fusal to grant plaintiff's motion to reopen the original action. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey held, two justices dissenting, that plaintiff could not in-
stitute her original action. Without reaching the question whether the divorce
revives an action for a prenuptial tort which was barred by marriage of the
parties, the majority decided the change in relationship between the parties
3. U.S. Const. amend. IV. N.D. Const. art. I, § 18 provides that. "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons and things to be seized".
N.D. Rev. Code § 29-2906 (1943) employs the phrase "reasonable particularity"
rather than "particularly describing".
4. State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103 (1917).
5. State v. John, 103 W. Va. 148, 136 S.E. 842 (1927).
6; Thompson v. State, 197 Tenn. App. 112, 270 S.W.2d 379 (1954); Chruscicki v.
Hinricks, 197 Wis. 78, 221 N.W. 394 (1928) (Correct owner's name, but incorrect range
and section numbers, held, valid).
7. United States v. Borkowski, 268 Fed. 72 (S.D. Ohio 1920).
8. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
9. Stone v. State, 276 P.2d 799 (Okla. 1954); Wallace v. State, 89 Okla. Crim. 365,
208 P.2d 190 (1949). See Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 662, 87 N.E. 103 (1909); People v.
Musk, 221 Mich. 578, 192 N.W. 485 (1923) (Accused was released due to use of dis-
cretion on part of officer).
10. Hedges v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 402, 265 P.2d 737 (1954); Dawson v. State, 90
Okla. Crim. 30, 210 P.2d 209 (1949) wherein range 19W as contained in the warrant
did not exist; the intended range being 19WIM-West of Indian Meridian. Held, des-
cription sufficient, because the officer was able to locate the place without the aid of
any information save that contained in the warrant. See Cotton v. State, 83 Okla. Crim.
349, 177 P.2d 155 (1947).
11. Dolen v. State, 187 Tenn. App. 663, 216 S.W.2d 351 (1948) (The court said
particularly means absence of ambiguity); Thompson v. Carson, 186 Tenn. App. 170,
208 S.W.2d 1019 (1948).
12. Jackson v. State, 87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924); Bonner v. State, 210 Ga. 475,
80 So.2d 683 (1955) wherein the warrant included Pensacola as part of the address of
the premises to be searched, where, in reality, said premises were outside city limits,
held, description valid.
